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New Government, old constraints: Armenia’s “Russia problem”
The Russian imperial tradition has played a critical role in determining Russian relations with the newly-independent states since the break- up of the Soviet Union. More specifically, the shift in the Russian leadership’s foreign policy thinking from ‘liberal ideas’ to geopolitical and particularly pragmatic geoeconomic realism in the early stage of Putin’s presidency (Thorun, 2009, p. 28) significantly determined policy priorities towards the newly independent CIS states. The ambition to restore Russia’s ‘greatness’ and in particular to regain control in its traditional ‘sphere of influence’ prompted Putin to renew and promote the so-called ‘CIS project’. The latter was designed to step up the Russian influence in its backyard and crush CIS states’ pro-Western foreign policy pursuits (Secreiru, 2006; Skak, 2011).
To this purpose, the Russian leadership embarked on increasing its economic presence and reinforcing its military presence in CIS countries. The takeover and monopolization of strategic economic and energy infrastructures in CIS countries was put at the heart of the Russian policy. (Secrieru, 2006).
The renewed ‘CIS project’ yielded considerable results in Armenia. More precisely, Armenian and Russian Presidents came up with the so called ‘mutually beneficial’ ‘asssets-for-debt’ swap that would gradually but immensely step up Russian influence in the Armenian economy since the fall of 2001 (Eurasianet, 2002). The recipe is simple: in exchange for a write-off of its around $100 million debt incurred since 1991, Armenia agreed to transfer strategic state-owned assets to Russia, including six hydroelectric power plants (Eurasianet, 2003). Moreover, in 2003, Armenia ratified an agreement that allowed Russian RAO Unified Energy Systems (UES) to take over the financial control of the Medzamor nuclear power plant, accounting for about 40 percent of Armenian electricity production (Azatutyun, 2003). Overall, Russia took over around 90 percent of Armenia’s power generating capacities. Besides, within the ‘assets-for-debt’ swap arrangements, Kocharyan’s government handed over Armenia’s largest cement factory to the Russian ITERA gas exporter in payment for its $10 million debt for past gas deliveries (Eurasianet, 2003).
Furthermore, in 2013 Armenia ceded control over all its natural gas infrastructure to the Russian energy firm Gazprom, in payment for a $300 million debt to Gazprom, which it incurred as a result of secretly subsidizing the Russian gas price from 2011-2013. In return for writing off the debt, Gazprom was also granted 30-year exclusive rights in the Armenian energy market (Asbarez, 2014).
Russia has repeatedly used Gazprom’s “energy weapon” to manipulate gas prices and thus exert political influence over the Armenian Government. Gazprom increased gas prices for Armenia by 50 percent and threatened to further increase it in case Armenia refused to join the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (Asbarez, 2013).
Remarkably, former President Serzh Sargsyan candidly admitted that Armenia was forced to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. “our choice is not civilizational. It corresponds to the economic interests of our nation. We cannot sign the Association Agreement and increase gas price and electricity fee three times?” (Terzyan, 2017, p. 191).
Ironically, Gazprom decreased gas prices as Armenia decided to join the EAEU. Yet, Russia raised the price for the gas it sells to Armenia by 10 percent in 2019. The price increase is “symptomatic of how the Kremlin is exploiting Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, using gas supply as a political instrument to put pressure on the Pashinyan-led Government,” Eduard Abrahamyan, a London-based analyst of Armenia (Eurasianet, 2019). Clearly, by using Gazprom’s energy weapon and increasing gas prices for Armenia, Russia strives to consolidate its influence over post-Velvet Revolution Armenia and suppress its desire to deepen partnership with the European Union and the United States (1in.am, 2018).
Notably, in an attempt to fight against Gazprom’s malpractices, the new Armenian Government launched an investigation in Gazprom Armenia and which led to finding a series of irregularities and even to accusing it of tax evasion and corruption (Rferl, 2018).
Ironically, as noted earlier in response to Armenian government’s bold attempt to hold Gazprom A It is worth to note that as a single country, Russia is the main external trade partner of Armenia, being the destination for 20 per cent of Armenian exports and source of 70 per cent of remittances (Worldbank, 2015). Russia also maintains lead in the realm of foreign investments in Armenia. According to official information, there are about 1,400 enterprises with Russian capital, which is over one fourth of all economic entities with involvement of foreign capital (Sargsyan, 2017). Armenia accountable, Gazprom determined to increase gas prices in 2019.
1. Новое правительство, старые ограничения: “Российская проблема” Армении
Российская имперская традиция сыграла решающую роль в определении отношений России с новыми независимыми государствами после распада Советского Союза. Более конкретно, сдвиг во внешнеполитическом мышлении российского руководства от "либеральных идей" к геополитическому и особенно прагматичному геоэкономическому реализму на раннем этапе президентства Путина в значительной степени определил приоритеты политики в отношении новых независимых государств СНГ. Стремление восстановить "величие" России и, в частности, вернуть контроль над ее традиционной "сферой влияния" побудило Путина возобновить и продвигать так называемый ‘проект СНГ’. Последнее было задумано для усиления российского влияния на ее задворках и подавления прозападных внешнеполитических устремлений государств СНГ.
С этой целью российское руководство приступило к наращиванию своего экономического присутствия и усилению военного присутствия в странах СНГ. Захват и монополизация стратегических экономических и энергетических инфраструктур в странах СНГ были положены в основу российской политики.
Обновленный ‘Проект СНГ" принес значительные результаты в Армении. Точнее, президенты Армении и России договорились о так называемом "взаимовыгодном" обмене "активов в обмен на долги", который с осени 2001 года постепенно, но безмерно усилил бы российское влияние в экономике Армении. Рецепт прост: в обмен на списание своего долга в размере около 100 миллионов долларов, возникшего с 1991 года, Армения согласилась передать России стратегические государственные активы, включая шесть гидроэлектростанций. Более того, в 2003 году Армения ратифицировала соглашение, которое позволило российскому РАО "Единые энергетические системы" (ЕЭС) взять под финансовый контроль Медзаморскую атомную электростанцию, на долю которой приходится около 40 процентов производства электроэнергии в Армении. В целом Россия завладела примерно 90 процентами генерирующих мощностей Армении. Кроме того, в рамках соглашения об обмене активов на долги правительство Кочаряна передало крупнейший цементный завод Армении российской компании-экспортеру газа "ИТЕРА" в качестве оплаты ее долга в размере 10 миллионов долларов за прошлые поставки газа.
Кроме того, в 2013 году Армения передала контроль над всей своей газовой инфраструктурой российской энергетической компании "Газпром" в качестве оплаты долга перед "Газпромом" в размере 300 миллионов долларов, который она понесла в результате тайного субсидирования цен на российский газ в 2011-2013 годах. В обмен на списание долга "Газпрому" также были предоставлены эксклюзивные права на энергетический рынок Армении сроком на 30 лет.
Россия неоднократно использовала “энергетическое оружие” Газпрома для манипулирования ценами на газ и, таким образом, оказания политического влияния на правительство Армении. "Газпром" повысил цены на газ для Армении на 50 процентов и пригрозил их дальнейшим повышением в случае отказа Армении присоединиться к Евразийскому экономическому союзу, в котором доминирует Россия (Asbarez, 2013).
Примечательно, что бывший президент Серж Саргсян откровенно признал, что Армения была вынуждена вступить в Евразийский экономический союз вместо подписания Соглашения об ассоциации с Европейским союзом. “наш выбор не является цивилизационным. Это соответствует экономическим интересам нашей страны. Мы не можем подписать Соглашение об ассоциации и увеличить цену на газ и электроэнергию в три раза?” (Терзян, 2017, с. 191).
По иронии судьбы, "Газпром" снизил цены на газ, когда Армения решила присоединиться к ЕАЭС. Тем не менее, Россия повысила цену на газ, который она продает Армении, на 10 процентов в 2019 году. Повышение цен является “симптомом того, как Кремль использует сильную зависимость Армении от российских углеводородов, используя поставки газа в качестве политического инструмента для оказания давления на правительство, возглавляемое Пашиняном”, - считает Эдуард Абрамян, лондонский аналитик по Армении (Eurasianet, 2019). Очевидно, что, используя энергетическое оружие "Газпрома" и повышая цены на газ для Армении, Россия стремится укрепить свое влияние на Армению после Бархатной революции и подавить ее стремление к углублению партнерства с Европейским Союзом и Соединенными Штатами. (1in.am , 2018).
Примечательно, что в попытке бороться со злоупотреблениями "Газпрома" новое правительство Армении начало расследование в "Газпром Армения", которое привело к выявлению ряда нарушений и даже обвинению компании в уклонении от уплаты налогов и коррупции (Rferl, 2018).
По иронии судьбы, как отмечалось ранее в ответ на смелую попытку правительства Армении удержать "Газпром", стоит отметить, что как отдельная страна Россия является основным внешнеторговым партнером Армении, являясь пунктом назначения для 20% армянского экспорта и источником 70% денежных переводов (Всемирный банк, 2015). Россия также сохраняет лидерство в сфере иностранных инвестиций в Армению. Согласно официальной информации, в стране насчитывается около 1400 предприятий с российским капиталом, что составляет более четверти всех хозяйствующих субъектов с участием иностранного капитала (Саргсян, 2017). Согласно отчетности, "Газпром" принял решение повысить цены на газ в 2019 году.
2.
The 2018 “Velvet revolution” in Armenia has raised numerous questions regarding its possible implications for Armenian-Russian relations. Given that there was a tendency for revolutions in post-Soviet countries to significantly influence their relations with Russia, it would be easy to jump to far-reaching conclusions about Armenia’s possible foreign policy changes. This paper explores the potential of the diasporic influence of the Armenian community in Russia over Armenian-Russian relations in the light of the Russian policy towards further consolidating its control over post-Velvet Revolution Armenia.
The paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What are Russian policy priorities vis à-vis Armenia, particularly, within its strategy for Eurasian integration? 2. What is the actual and potential influence of the Armenian community in Russia over Armenian-Russian relations. This paper argues that along with other economic and political tools, Russia has consistently used the Armenian community to step up its influence over Armenia and suppress its European foreign policy aspirations. The study is based on qualitative research methods elaborating an in-depth case analysis through process tracing. In terms of data, the research relies on two main sources.
First, it relies on open source information websites, documents and speeches. Second, it relies on semi-structured elite interviews. These interviews have been conducted between February 2015 and April 2018 in Yerevan, Moscow and Brussels. The respondents for these interviews have been selected through a combination of purposive sampling (selecting respondents on the basis of their alleged knowledge or centrality in the policy process) and snowball sampling (asking each respondent for other possible interviewees).
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