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17
In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil. 9 The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
18
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political prioritywhich is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course withthe present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat’s visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March 1979. 10
19
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-
Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the longrun. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could bedriven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day. 11
20
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into “fact.” In reality, however, Egypt’s power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. 12 In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.
21
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run. 13
22
The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today. 14
23
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization. 15
24
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of the present political structure. 16
25
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does notconstitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.
26
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long time, and Israel’s policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also causethe termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigration from the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa’amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan. 17
27
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of ’67 and the territories beyond them, those of ’48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of ’67. It should be clear, under any future political situation or military constellation, that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.
28
Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews today. l8
29
Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by our own growing isolation. l9
30
From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with nocompromises. 20 Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the present form in the future. 21
31
Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat’s method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken “peace” policy and theproblem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
1
Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.
2
The Military Background of The Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many occasions where something very like it is being “explained” in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian “unrest” on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of “Haddad forces” or of “Village Associations” (also known as “Village Leagues”): local forces under “leaders” completely dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example). The “states” proposed by Yinon are “Haddadland” and “Village Associations,” and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be “punished” either by mass humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.
3
It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.
4
Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin’s speeches) has to bepersuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes inwhich it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid “persuaders” and “explainers” (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then “learn it,” more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was “in opposition”) the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering “the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity” was explained in the years 1965-67.
5
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?
6
In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the “liberal” American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call “the constructive criticism.” (In fact those among them who claim also to be “Anti-Stalinist” are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always “good intentions” and only “makes mistakes,” and therefore such a plan would not be a matter for discussion–exactly as the Biblical genocides committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a “closed society” to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak
June 17, 1982 Jerusalem
ДОГОВОР № 24
О ПОСТАВКЕ ШВЕЙНОГО ОБОРУДОВАНИЯ
г. Нижневартовск «___»_________ 2006 г.
ООО «Трейд-С», именуемое в дальнейшем «Поставщик», в лице генерального директора Брауна Н., действующего на основании Устава, с одной стороны и АО «Медиа», именуемое в дальнейшем «Покупатель», в лице генерального директора Петрова С.П. действующего на основании Устава, с другой стороны в целях организации долгосрочного сотрудничества по поставкам продукции заключили настоящий договор о нижеследующем:
1. Предмет договора
На основании настоящего договора между Поставщиком и Покупателем устанавливаются прямые длительные хозяйственные отношения по поставкам швейного оборудования на период с _________ по ________.
2. Количество и ассортимент продукции
2.1. В соответствии с настоящим договором Поставщик обязуется поставлять Покупателю, а Покупатель принимать и оплачивать продукцию в следующих объемах: _____
2.2. Покупатель не позднее _______ представляет Поставщику заказ на необходимую ему в предстоящем году продукцию с указанием общего количества продукции с разбивкой по кварталам в пределах общего объема и группового ассортимента, предусмотренных п. 2.1. настоящего договора на соответствующий год. К годовому заказу прилагается спецификация с указанием развернутого ассортимента подлежащей поставке продукции на первое полугодие планируемого года. Спецификация на необходимую продукцию в развернутом ассортименте на последующее полугодие представляется Покупателем не позднее, чем за 20 дней до наступления полугодия поставки.
2.3. Поставщик в 20-дневный срок после получения заказа (спецификации) Покупателя рассматривает его предложения и учитывает их при формировании производства продукции на соответствующий период.
2.4. Заказ (спецификация) Покупателя, а также изменения заказа считаются принятыми, если Поставщик в 20-дневный срок после его получения не сообщит Покупателю своих возражений по заказу (спецификации). При наличии возражений по заказу (спецификации) либо предложений по изменению заказа (спецификации) Поставщик в указанный срок принимает меры к урегулированию разногласий.
3. Качество и комплектность продукции
3.1. Качество и комплектность поставляемой продукции должны соответствовать: стандарту No. __; техническим условиям No. _____.
3.2. Поставщик гарантирует доброкачественность и надежность поставляемой продукции в течение 3 лет.
4. Сроки и порядок поставки продукции
4.1. Поставка продукции в течение квартала производится в следующие сроки:____________.
Отгрузка продукции в течение периода поставки производится по согласованному сторонами графику. График отгрузки продукции на ______ 2006 г. прилагается к настоящему договору. Предложенный заинтересованной стороной проект нового графика отгрузки считается принятым другой стороной, если последняя в течение ______ дней после получения проекта не заявит возражений.
4.2. Количество продукции, недопоставленной (невыбранное) в одном месяце квартала, подлежит поставке (выборке) в следующем месяце данного квартала и прибавляется к норме поставки _________________.
4.3. Отгрузка продукции Поставщиком производится в соответствии с минимальными нормами отгрузки, предусмотренными Особыми условиями поставки.
4.4. Отгрузка продукции в адрес Покупателя производится Поставщиком ж.д.транспортом на условиях FOT.
4.5. Поставщик информирует Покупателя о планируемых отгрузках
телеграфом в срок, не превышающий 3 рабочих дня с момента отгрузки.
4.6. На каждую партию отгружаемой продукции Поставщиком выписывается ж.д. накладная с указанием кол.ед.
5. Тара и упаковка
5.1. Тара и упаковка продукции должны соответствовать техническим условиям № __.
5.2. Дополнительные требования к таре и упаковке устанавливаются соглашением сторон.
5.3. Покупатель обязуется возвратить тару в порядке и в сроки, предусмотренные в Приложении № 3.
5.4. Тара из-под продукции, порядок и сроки возврата которой не установлены обязательными для сторон правилами, подлежит возврату Покупателем Поставщику не позднее чем через 20 дней после получения продукции.
6. Цены и порядок расчетов
6.1. Покупатель оплачивает Поставщику поставленную продукцию по ценам прейскуранта No. _______.
6.2. Услуги, оказываемые Поставщиком Покупателю в соответствии с настоящим договором, если тарифы на них не подлежат утверждению государственными органами ценообразования, оплачиваются Покупателем в следующей форме: 100% оплата в долларах США переводится телеграфным переводом на счет Поставщика не позднее 10 дней с даты ж/д накладной против указанных документов:
– факсовые копии ж/д накладной;
– коммерческий инвойс в оригинале (3 экз.);
– сертификат качества, выданный производителем (1 экз.).
Указанные документы высылаются Покупателю заказным письмом в течение 15 дней с момента отгрузки.
7. Имущественная ответственность
7.1. За отгрузку продукции с нарушением согласованного графика Поставщик уплачивает Покупателю штраф в размере ______процентов стоимости продукции, отгруженной не по графику. Под нарушением согласованного графика понимается как просрочка отгрузки, так и досрочная отгрузка продукции против графика без согласия Покупателя. Указанный штраф уплачивается Поставщиком независимо от уплаты неустойки за недопоставку продукции в месячные сроки.