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2 Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the Emergency Force- A-6730-Add 3- 26 June 1967
XI. THE SIX-DAY WAR
2. Report of the Secretary-General on the
Withdrawal of the Emergency Force,
A/6730/Add. 3, 26 June 1967.
On 18 May 1967, Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad cabled Secretary- General U Thant and asked for the termination of the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force stationed in the Gaza Strip and at Sharm el-Sheikh and on the Sinai border since December 1956. Riad asked that the Force be withdrawn as soon as possible. A day later, without consulting with Israel or the Powers, U Thant agreed that Egypt had the tight to demand that the Force be withdrawn. On 19 May 1967, the UNflag was taken down in Gaza, the Force ceased its operations and awaited its repatriation. Its hasty withdrawal was later the subject of much controversy. The report by U Thant on the reasons which led him to order UNEFs withdrawal follows:
Introduction
1. This report on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.) is submitted because, as indicated in my statement on 20 June 1967 to the fifth emergency session of the General Assembly (1527th plenary meeting), important questions have been raised concerning the actions taken on the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. These questions merit careful consideration and comment. It is in the interest of the United Nations, I believe, that this report should be full and frank, in view of the questions involved and the numerous statements that have been made, both public and private, which continue to be very damaging to the United Nations and to its peacekeeping role in particular. Despite the explanations already given in the several reports on the subject which have been submitted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, misunderstandings and what, I fear, are misrepresentations, persist, in official as well as unofficial circles, publicly and behind the scenes.
2. A report of this kind is not the place to try to explain why there has been so much and such persistent and grossly mistaken judgment about the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. It suffices to say here that the shattering crisis in the Near East inevitably caused intense shock in many capitals and countries of the world, together with deep frustration over the inability to cope with it. It is, of course, not unusual in such situations to seek easy explanations and excuses. When, however, this tactic involves imputing responsibility for the unleashing of major hostilities, it is, and must be, a cause for sober concern. The objective of this report is to establish an authentic, factual record of actions and their causes.
3. It follows, therefore, that the emphasis here will be upon facts. The report is intended to be neither a polemic nor an apologia. Its sole purpose is to present a factually accurate picture of what happened and why. It will serve well the interests of the United Nations, as well as of historic integrity, if this presentation of facts can help to dissipate some of the distortions of the record which, in some places, apparently have emanated from panic, emotion and political bias.
Chronology of Relevant Actions
4. Not only events, but dates, and even the time of day, have an important bearing on this exposition. The significant events and actions and their dates and times are therefore set forth below.
16 May 1967
5. 2000 hours G.M.T. (2200 hours Gaza local time). A message from General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, was received by the Commander of U.N.E.F. Major General Rikhye, requesting withdrawal of all U.N. troops which install O.P.'s along our borders.' (A-6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3(a).) Brigadier Mokhtar, who handed General Fawzy's letter to the Commander of U.N.E.F., told General Rikhye at the time that he must order the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops from El Sabha and Sharm el-Sheikh on the night of 16 May since United Arab Republic armed forces must gain control of these two places that very night. The U.N.E.F. Commander correctly replied that he did not have authority to withdraw his troops from these positions on such an order and could do so only on instructions from the Secretary General; therefore, he must continue with U.N.E.F. operations in Sinai as hitherto. Brigadier Mokhtar told the Commander of U.N.E.F. that this might lead to conflict on that night (16 May) between United Arab Republic and U.N.E.F. troops, and insisted that the Commander issue orders to U.N.E.F. troops to remain confined to their camps at El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh. General Rikhye replied that he could not comply with this request. He did, of course, inform the contingent commanders concerned of these developments. He also informed United Nations Headquarters that he proposed to continue with U.N.E.F. activities as established until he received fresh instructions from the Secretary General.
6. 2130 hours G.M.T. (1730 hours New York time). The Secretary General received at this time the U.N.E.F. Commander's cable informing him of the abovementioned message from General Fawzy. The U.N.E.F. Commander was immediately instructed to await further instructions from the Secretary General and pending this later word from him, to 'be firm in maintaining U.N.E.F. position while being as understanding and as diplomatic as possible in your relations with local U.A.R. officials.'
7. 2245 G.M.T. (1845 hours New York time). The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic visited the Secretary General at this time at the latter's urgent request. The Secretary General requested the Permanent Representative to communicate with his Government with the utmost urgency and to transmit to it his views (A-6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3(c)). In particular, the Secretary General requested the Permanent Representative to obtain his Government's clarification of the situation, pointing out that any request for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. must come directly to the Secretary General from the Government of the United Arab Republic.
8. 2344 hours G.M.T. The U.N.E.F. Commander further reported at this time that considerable military activity had been observed in the El Arish area since the afternoon of 16 May 1967.
17 May 1967
9. 0800 hours G.M.T. (0400 hours New York time). The Commander of U.N.E.F. reported then that, on the morning of 17 May, thirty soldiers of the Army of the United Arab Republic had occupied El Sabha in Sinai and that United Arab Republic troops were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the U.N.E.F. observation post there. Three armoured cars of the United Arab Republic were located near the Yugoslav U.N.E.F. camp at El Sabha and detachments of fifteen soldiers each had taken up positions north and south of the Yugoslav contingent's camp at El Amr. All U.N.E.F. observation posts along the armistice demarcation line and the international frontier were manned as usual, but in some places United Arab Republic troops were also at the line.
10. 1030 hours G.M.T. (0630 hours New York time). The Commander of U.N.E.F. reported then that troops of the United Arab Republic had occupied the U.N.E.F. observation post at El Sabha and that the Yugoslav U.N.E.F. camps at El Quseima and El Sabha were now behind the positions of the Army of the United Arab Republic. The Commander of U.N.E.F. informed the Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff of these developments, expressing his serious concern at them. The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff agreed to request the immediate evacuation of the observation post at El Sabha by United Arab Republic troops and shortly thereafter reported that orders to this effect had been given by the United Arab Republic military authorities. He requested, however, that, to avoid any further misunderstandings, the Yugoslav observation post at El Sabha should be withdrawn immediately to El Quseima camp. The Commander replied that any such withdrawal would require the authorization of the Secretary General.
11. 1200 hours G.M.T. (0800 hours New York time). The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff at this time conveyed to the Commander of U.N.E.F. a request from General Mohd Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav detachments of U.N.E.F. in Sinai within twenty-four hours. He added that the U.N.E.F. Commander might take "48 hours or so" to withdraw the U.N.E.F. detachment from Sharm el-Sheikh. The Commander of the U.N.E.F. replied that any such move required instructions from the Secretary General.
12. 0930 hours G.M.T. (1600 hours New York time). The Secretary General at this date held an informal meeting in his office with the representatives of countries providing contingents to U.N.E.F. to inform them of the situation as then known. There was an exchange of views. The Secretary General gave his opinion on how he should and how he intended to proceed, observing that if a formal request for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. were to be made by the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary General, in his view, would have to comply with it, since the Force was on United Arab Republic territory only with the consent of the Government and could not remain there without it. Two representatives expressed serious doubts about the consequences of agreeing to a peremptory request for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and raised the questions of consideration of such a request by the General Assembly and an appeal to the United Arab Republic not to request the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. Two other representatives stated the view that the United Arab Republic was entitled to request the removal of U.N.E.F. at any moment and that that request would have to be respected regardless of what the General Assembly might have to say in the matter, since the agreement for U.N.E.F.'s presence had been concluded between the then Secretary General and the Government of Egypt. A clarification of the situation from the United Arab Republic should therefore be awaited.
14. 2150 hours G.M.T. (1750 hours New York time). The Secretary General at this time saw the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic and handed to him an aide-mémoire, the text of which is contained in paragraph 6 of document A-6730. The Secretary General also gave to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire calling to the attention of his Government the 'good faith' accord, the text of which is contained in paragraph 7 of document A-6730.
18 May 1967
15. 1321 hours G.M.T. (0921 hours New York time). The Commander of U.N.E.F. reported at this time that his liaison officer in Cairo had been informed by an ambassador of one of the countries providing contingents to U.N.E.F. that the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic had summoned the representatives of nations with troops in U.N.E.F. to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and informed them that U.N.E.F. had terminated its tasks in the United Arab Republic and in the Gaza Strip and must depart from the above territory forthwith. This information was confirmed by representatives of some of these countries at the United Nations.
16. Early on 18 May the U.N.E.F. sentries proceeding to man the normal observation post at El Sabha in Sinai were prevented from entering the post and from remaining in the area by United Arab Repubiic soldiers. The sentries were then forced to withdraw. They did not resist by use of force since they had no mandate to do so.
17. 1100 hours G.M.T. United Arab Republic soldiers at this time forced Yugoslav U.N.E.F. sentries out of their observation post on the international frontier in front of El Kuntilla Camp. One hour later, United Arab Republic officers arrived at the water point and asked U.N.E.F. soldiers to withdraw the guard.
18. 1220 hours G.M.T. At this hour United Arab Republic soldiers entered the U.N.E.F. observation post on the international frontier in front of El Amr Camp and forced the Yugoslav soldiers to withdraw. Later two United Arab Republic officers visited El Amr Camp and asked the U.N.E.F. platoon to withdraw within fifteen minutes.
19. 1210 hours G.M.T. United Arab Republic officers then visited the Yugoslav camp at Sharm el-Sheikh and informed the Commanding Officer that they had come to take over the camp and the U.N.E.F. observation post at Ras Nasrani, demanding a reply within 15 minutes. The contingent commander replied that he had no instructions to hand over the positions.
20. 1430 hours G.M.T. The U.N.E.F. Yugoslav detachment at El Quseima Camp reported that two artillery shells, apparently ranging rounds from the United Arab Republic artillery, had burst between the U.N.E.F. Yugoslav camps at El Quseima and El Sabha.
21. 1030 hours New York time. The Secretary General met at this time with the Permanent Representative of Israel who gave his Government's views on the situation, emphasizing that the U.N.E.F. withdrawal should not be achieved by a unilateral United Arab Republic request alone and asserting Israel's right to a voice in the matter. The question of stationing U.N.E.F. on the Israel side of the line was raised by the Secretary General and this was declared by the Permanent Representative of Israel to be entirely unacceptable to his Government.
22. 1600 hours G.M.T. (12 noon New York time). At this hour the Secretary General received through the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic the following message from Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:
'The Government of the United Arab Republic has the honor to inform Your Excellency that it has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza Strip. 'Therefore, I request that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the force as soon as possible.
'I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my gratitude and warm regards.'
At the same meeting the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary General of the strong feeling of resentment in Cairo at what was there considered to be attempts to exert pressure and to make U.N.E.F. an 'occupation force'.
The Secretary General expressed deep misgivings about the likely disastrous consequences of the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and indicated his intention to appeal urgently to President Nasser to reconsider the decision. Later in the day, the representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary General that the Foreign Minister had asked the Permanent Representative by telephone from Cairo to convey to the Secretary General his urgent advice that the Secretary General should not make an appeal to President Nasser to reconsider the request for withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and that, if he did so, such a request would be sternly rebuffed. The Secretary General raised the question of a possible visit by him to Cairo and was shortly thereafter informed that such a visit as soon as possible would be welcomed by the Government of the United Arab Republic.
23. 1700 hours New York time. The Secretary General met with the U.N.E.F. Advisory Committee, set up under the terms of paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7/8 November 1956, and the representatives of three countries not members of the Advisory Committee but providing contingents to U.N.E.F., to inform them of developments and particularly the United Arab Republic's request for U.N.E.F.'s withdrawal, and to consult them for their views on the situation. At this meeting, one of the views expressed was that the United Arab Republic's demand for the immediate withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from United Arab Republic territory was not acceptable and that the ultimate responsibility for the decision to withdraw rested with the United Nations acting through the Security Council or the General Assembly. The holder of this view therefore urged further discussion with the Government of the United Arab Republic as well as with other Governments involved. Another position was that the Secretary General had no choice but to comply with the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic, one representative stating that the moment the request for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. was known his Government would comply with it and withdraw its contingent. A similar position had been taken in Cairo by another Government providing a contingent. No proposal was made that the Advisory Committee should exercise the right vested in it by General Assembly Resolution 1001 (ES-I) to request the convening of the General Assembly to take up the situation arising from the United Arab Republic communication. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was understood that the Secretary General had no alternative other than to comply with the United Arab Republic's demand, although some representatives felt that the Secretary General should previously clarify with that Government the meaning in its request that withdrawal should take place 'as soon as possible'. The Secretary General informed the Advisory Committee that he intended to reply promptly to the United Arab Republic, and to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on the action he had taken. It was for the member states to decide whether the competent organs should or could take up the matter and to pursue it accordingly.
24. After the meeting of the Advisory Committee, at approximately 1900 hours New York time on 18 May, the Secretary General replied to the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic through that Government's Permanent Representative as follows:
I have the honor to acknowledge your letter to me of 18 May conveying the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic concerning the United Nations Emergency Force. Please be so kind as to transmit to the Foreign Minister the following message in reply:
Dear Mr. Minister,
Your message informing me that your Government no longer consents to the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on the territory of the United Arab Republic, that is to say in Sinai, and in the Gaza Strip, and requesting that the necessary steps be taken for its withdrawal as soon as possible, was delivered to me by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic at noon on 18 May.
'As I have indicated to your Permanent Representative on 16 May, the United Nations Emergency Force entered Egyptian territory with the consent of your Government and in fact can remain there only so long as that consent continues. In view of the message now received from you, therefore, your Government's request will be complied with and I am proceeding to issue instructions for the necessary arrangements to be put in train without delay for the orderly withdrawal of the force, its vehicles and equipment and for the disposal of all properties pertaining to it. I am, of course, also bringing this development and my actions and intentions to the attention of the U.N.E.F. Advisory Committee and to all Governments providing contingents for the force. A full report covering this development will be submitted promptly by me to the General Assembly, and I consider it necessary to report also to the Security Council about some aspects of the current situation in the area.'
Irrespective of the reasons for the action you have taken, in all frankness, may I advise you that I have serious misgivings about it for, as I have said each year in my annual reports to the General Assembly on U.N.E.F., I believe that this force has been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past 10 years and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace.
With warm personal regards,
U Thant
It is to be noted that the decision notified to the Government of the United Arab Republic in this letter was in compliance with the request to withdraw the force. It did not, however, signify the actual withdrawal of the force which, in fact, was to remain in the area for several more weeks.
25. Formal instructions relating to the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. were sent to the U.N.E.F. Commander by the Secretary General on the night of 18 May (see Annex).
26. Also on the evening of 18 May the Secretary General submitted his special report to the General Assembly (A-6730).
27. On 19 May the Secretary General issued his report to the Security Council on recent developments in the Near East.
19 May 1967
28. 1130 hours New York time. The Secretary General again received the Permanent Representative of Israel who gave him a statement from his Government (S-7896) concerning the withdrawal of U.N.E.F., strongly urging the Secretary General to avoid condoning any changes in the status quo pending the fullest and broadest international consultation.
29. On the afternoon of 22 May, the Secretary General departed from New York, arriving in Cairo on the afternoon of 23 May. He left Cairo on the afternoon of 25 May, arriving back in New York on 26 May (see S-7906). While en route to Cairo during a stop in Paris, the Secretary General learned that on this day President Nasser had announced his intention to reinstitute the blockade against Israel in the Straits of Tiran.
17 June 1967
30. The withdrawal of U.N.E.F. was completed. Details of the actual withdrawal and evacuation of U.N.E.F. are given in document A/6730/Add. 2.
Main Points at Issue
31. Comment is called for on some of the main points at issue even prior to the consideration of the background and basis for the stationing of U.N.E.F. on United Arab Republic territory.
The Causes of the Present Crisis
32. It has been said rather often in one way or another that the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. is a primary cause of the present crisis in the Near East. This is, of course, a superficial and oversimplified approach. As the Secretary General pointed out in his report of 26 May 1967 to the Security Council (S-7906), this view 'ignores the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along and of which the crisis situation created by the unexpected withdrawal of U.N.E.F. is the latest expression'. The Secretary General's report to the Security Council of 19 May 1967 (S-7896) described the various elements of the increasingly dangerous situation in the Near East prior to the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the presence of U.N.E.F. on its territory.
33. The United Nations Emergency Force served for more than 10 years as a highly valuable instrument in helping to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Its withdrawal revealed in all its depth and danger the undiminishing conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours. The withdrawal also made immediately acute the problem of access for Israel to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran - a problem which had been dormant for over ten years only because of the presence of U.N.E.F. But the presence of U.N.E.F. did not touch the basic problem of the Arab-Israel conflict - it merely isolated, immobilized and covered up certain aspects of that conflict. At any time in the last ten years either of the parties could have reactivated the conflict and if they had been determined to do so U.N.E.F.'s effectiveness would automatically have disappeared. When, in the context of the whole relationship of Israel with her Arab neighbours, the direct confrontation between Israel and the United Arab Republic was revived after a decade by the decision of the United Arab Republic to move its forces up to the line, U.N.E.F. at once lost all usefulness. In fact, its effectiveness as a buffer and as a presence had already vanished as can be seen from the chronology given above, even before the request for its withdrawal had been received by the Secretary General from the Government of the United Arab Republic. In recognizing the extreme seriousness of the situation thus created, its true cause, the continuing Arab-Israel conflict, must also he recognized. It is entirely unrealistic to maintain that that conflict could have been solved, or its consequences prevented, if a greater effort had been made to maintain U.N.E.F.'s presence in the area against the will of the Government of the United Arab Republic.
The Decision on U.N.E.F.'s Withdrawal
34. The decision to withdraw U.N.E.F. has been frequently characterized in various quarters as 'hasty', 'precipitous', and the like, even, indeed, to the extent of suggesting that it took President Nasser by surprise. The question of the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. is by no means a new one. In fact, it was the negotiations on this very question with the Government of Egypt which, after the establishment of U.N.E.F. by the General Assembly, delayed its arrival while it waited in a staging area at Capodichino airbase, Naples, Italy, for several days in November 1956. The Government of Egypt, understandably, did not wish to give permission for the arrival on its soil of an international force, unless it was assured that its sovereignty would be respected and a request for withdrawal of the force would be honoured. Over the years, in discussions with representatives of the United Arab Republic, the subject of the continued presence of U.N.E.F. has occasionally come up, and it was invariably taken for granted by United Arab Republic representatives that if their Government officially requested the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. the request would be honoured by the Secretary General. There is no record to indicate that this assumption was ever questioned. Thus, although the request came as a surprise, there was nothing new about the question of principle nor about the procedure to be followed by the Secretary General. It follows that the decision taken by him on 18 May 1967 to comply with the request for the withdrawal of the force was seen by him as the only reasonable and sound action that could be taken. The actual withdrawal itself, it should be recalled, was to be carried out in an orderly, dignified, deliberate and not precipitate manner over a period of several weeks. The first troops in fact left the area only on 29 May.
The Possibility of Delay
35. Opinions have also been frequently expressed that the decision to withdraw U.N.E.F. should have been delayed pending consultations, of various kinds, or that efforts should have been made to resist the United Arab Republic's request for U.N.E.F.'s withdrawal, or to bring pressure to bear on the Government of the United Arab Republic to reconsider its decision in this matter. In fact, as the chronology given above makes clear, the effectiveness of U.N.E.F. in the light of the movement of United Arab Republic troops up to the line and into Sharm el-Sheikh had already vanished before the request for withdrawal was received. Furthermore, the Government of the United Arab Republic had made it entirely clear to the Secretary General that an appeal for reconsideration of the withdrawal decision would encounter a firm rebuff and would be considered as an attempt to impose U.N.E.F. as an 'army of occupation'. Such a reaction, combined with the fact that U.N.E.F. positions on the line had already been effectively taken over by United Arab Republic troops in pursuit of their full right to move up to the line in their own territory, and a deep anxiety for the security of U.N.E.F. personnel should an effort be made to keep U.N.E.F. in position after its withdrawal had been requested, were powerful arguments in favour of complying with the United Arab Republic request, even supposing there had not been other overriding reasons for accepting it.