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81. In letters dated 3 November 1956 addressed to the Secretary General, the representatives of both France and the United Kingdom had proposed very broad functions for U.N.E.F., stating on behalf of their Governments that military action could be stopped if the following conditions were met:
(a) Both the Egyptian and Israel Governments agree to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace.
(b) The United Nations decides to constitute and maintain such a force until an Arab-Israel peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangements have been agreed in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the United Nations.
(c) In the meantime, until the United Nations force is constituted, both combatants agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Anglo-French troops to be stationed between the combatants. (Ibid., First Emergency Special Session, Annexes, Documents A-3268 and A-3269.)
These broad functions for the force were not acceptable to the General Assembly, however, as was pointed out in telegrams dated 4 November 1956 from Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom. (Ibid., Document A-3284, Annexes 2 and 4.)
82. Finally, it is obvious that the task referred to in the 'good faith' aide-mémoire could only be the task of the force as it had been defined in November 1956 when the understanding was concluded. The 'good faith' undertaking by the United Nations would preclude it from claiming that the Egyptian agreement was relevant or applicable to functions which the force was given at a much later date. The stationing of the force on the armistice demarcation line and at Sharm el-Sheikh was only determined in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI) on 2 February 1957. The Secretary General, in his reports relating to this decision, made it clear that the further consent of Egypt was essential with respect to these new functions. (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Documents A-3512, para. 20, and A-3527, para. 5.) Consequently the understanding recorded in the 'good faith' aide-mémoire of 20 November 1956 could not have been, itself, a commitment with respect to functions only determined in February and March 1957. It is only these later tasks that the force had been performing during the last 10 years - tasks of serving as a buffer and deterring infiltrators which went considerably beyond those of securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities provided in the General Assembly resolutions and referred to in the 'good faith' aide-mémoire.
The Stationing of U.N.E.F. on the Armistice Demarcation Line and at Sharm el-Sheikh
83. There remains to examine whether Egypt made further commitments with respect to the stationing of the force on the armistice demarcation line and at Shann el-Sheikh. Israel, of course, sought to obtain such commitments, particularly with respect to the area around Sharm el-Sheikh.
84. For example, in an aide-mémoire of 4 February 1957 (ibid., Document A-3527, annex I), Israel sought clarification as to whether units of the United Nations Emergency Force would be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts, and would remain so deployed until another effective means was agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary General pointed out that such 'clarification' would require 'Egyptian consent.' He stated:
'The second of the points in the Israel aide-mémoire requests a "clarification" which, in view of the position of the General Assembly, could go beyond what was stated in the last report only after negotiation with Egypt. This follows from the statements in the debate in the General Assembly, and the report on which it was based, which makes it clear that the stationing of the force at Sharm el-Sheikh, under such terms as those mentioned in the question posed by Israel, would require Egyptian consent. ' (Ibid., Document A-3527, para. 5.)
85. It is clear from the record that Egypt did not give its consent to Israel's proposition. The Secretary General's report of 8 March 1957 (ibid., document A-3568) recorded 'arrangements for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly'. There is no agreement on the part of Egypt to forgo its rights with respect to the granting or withdrawing of its consent to the continued stationing of the force on its territory. On the contrary, at the 667th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 4 March 1957, the Foreign Minister of Egypt stated:
'At our previous meeting I stated that the Assembly was unanimous in expecting full and honest implementation of its resolutions calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal by Israel. I continue to submit to the Assembly that this position - which is the only position the Assembly can possibly take - remains intact and entire. Nothing said by anyone here or elsewhere could shake this fact or detract from its reality and its validity, nor could it affect the fullness and the lawfulness of Egypt's rights and those of the Arab people of the Gaza Strip.' (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 667th meeting, para 240.)
86. The Foreign Minister of Israel in her statement at the 666th meeting of the General Assembly, on I March 1957, asserted that an assurance had been given that any proposal for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from the Gulf of Aqaba area would come first to the Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. (see paragraphs 95-98 below).
Question of the Stationing of U.N.E.F. on Both Sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line
87. Another point having significance with respect to the undertakings of Egypt is the question of the stationing of U.N.E.F. on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. The Secretary General, in his report on 24 January 1957 to the General Assembly (ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Document A-3512), suggested that the force should have units stationed also on the Israel side of the armistice demarcation line. In particular, he suggested that units of the force should at least be stationed in the El Auja demilitarized zone. (Article VIII of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement provides, inter alia, that an area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in the article, shall be demilitarized and that both Egyptian and Israel armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom. The article further provides that on the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila which had been occupied by the armed forces of Israel.) He indicated that if El Auja were demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and units of U.N.E.F. were stationed there, a condition of reciprocity would be the Egyptian assurance that Egyptian forces would not take up positions in the area in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Document A-3512, paras. 15-22.) However, Israel forces were never withdrawn from El Auja and U.N.E.F. was not accepted at any point on the Israel side of the line.
88. Following the Secretary General's report, the General Assembly on 2 February 1957 adopted Resolution 1125 (XI), in which it noted the report with appreciation and considered:
'... that, after withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area.'
89. On 11 February 1957, the Secretary General stated in a report to the General Assembly that, in the light of the implication of Israel's question concerning the stationing of U.N.E.F. at Shann el-Sheikh (see paragraph 84 above), he 'considered it important ... to learn whether Israel itself, in principle, consents to a stationing of U.N.E.F. units on its territory in implementation of the functions established for the force in the basic decisions and noted in Resolution 1125 (XI), where it was indicated that the force should be placed "on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line." ' (Ibid., Document A-3527, para. 5.) No affirmative response was ever received from Israel. In fact, already on 7 November 1956 the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion, in a speech to the Knesset, stated, inter alia, 'On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory or in any of the territories occupied by her.' In a note to correspondents of 12 April 1957 a 'United Nations spokesman' stated:
'Final arrangements for the U.N.E.F. will have to wait for the response of the Government of Israel to the request by the General Assembly that the force be deployed also on the Israeli side of the armistice demarcation line.'
90. In a report dated 9 October 1957 to the 12th session of the General Assembly (ibid., Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, Document A-3694, para. 15), the Secretary General stated:
'Resolution 1125 (XI) calls for placing the Force "on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line", but no stationing of U.N.E.F. on the Israel side has occurred to date through lack of consent by Israel.'
91. In the light of Israel's persistent refusal to consent to the stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on its side of the line in spite of General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 and the efforts of the Secretary General, it is even less possible to consider that Egypt's 'good faith' declaration made in November 1956 could constitute a limitation of its rights with respect to the continued stationing and operation of U.N.E.F. on Egyptian territory in accordance with the Resolution of 2 February 1957.
92. The representative of Israel stated at the 592nd meeting of the General Assembly, on 23 November 1956:
'If we were to accept one of the proposals made here - namely that the force should separate Egyptian and Israel troops for as long as Egypt thought it convenient and should then be withdrawn on Egypt's unilateral request - we would reach a reduction to absurdity. Egypt would then be in a position to build up, behind the screen of this force, its full military preparations and, when it felt that those military preparations had reached their desired climax, to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Force and to stand again in close contact and proximity with the territory of Israel. This reduction to absurdity proves how impossible it is to accept in any matter affecting the composition or the functions of the force the policies of the Egyptian Government as the sole or even the decisive criterion.' (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 592nd meeting, para. 131.)
93. The answer to this problem which is to be found in Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 is not in the form of a binding commitment by Egypt which the record shows was never given, but in the proposal that the force should be stationed on both sides of the line. Israel in the exercise of its sovereign right did not give its consent to the stationing of U.N.E.F. on its territory and Egypt did not forgo its sovereign right to withdraw its consent at any time.
Role of the U.N.E.F. Advisory Committee
94. General Assembly Resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, by which the Assembly approved the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of U.N.E.F., established an Advisory Committee on U.N.E.F. under the chairmanship of the Secretary General. The Assembly decided that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, should be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arose which, in its opinion, were of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself.
95. The memorandum of important points in the discussion between the representative of Israel and the Secretary General on 25 February 1957 recorded the following question raised by the representative of Israel:
'In connection with the duration of U.N.E.F.'s deployment in the Sharm el Sheikh area, would the Secretary General give notice to the General Assembly of the United Nations before U.N.E.F. would be withdrawn from the area, with or without Egyptian insistence, or before the Secretary General would agree to its withdrawal?' (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, Document A-3563, annex I, A, 2.)
96. The response of the Secretary General was recorded as follows:
'On the question of notification to the General Assembly, the Secretary General wanted to state his view at a later meeting. An indicated procedure would be for the Secretary General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly.' (Ibid., annex I, B. 2.)
97. On 1 March 1957 the Foreign Minister of Israel stated at the 666th plenary meeting of the General Assembly:
'My Government has noted the assurance embodied in the Secretary General's note of 26 February 1957 (A-3363, annex) that any proposal for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gulf of Aqaba area would first come to the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which represents the General Assembly in the implementation of its Resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956. This procedure will give the General Assembly an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes are made which would have the effect of increasing the possibility of belligerent acts.' (Ibid., Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 666th meeting, para. 8.)
98. In fact, the 25 February 1957 memorandum does not go as far as the interpretation given by the Foreign Minister of Israel. In any event, however, it gives no indication of any commitment by Egypt, and so far as the Secretary General is concerned it only indicates that a procedure would be for the Secretary General to inform the Advisory Committee which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the General Assembly. This was also the procedure provided in General Assembly Resolution 1001 (ES-I). It was, furthermore, the procedure followed by the Secretary General on the withdrawal of U.N.E.F.
Observations
99. A partial explanation of the misunderstanding about the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. is an evident failure to appreciate the essentially fragile nature of the basis for U.N.E.F.'s operation throughout its existence. U.N.E.F. in functioning depended completely on the voluntary cooperation of the host Government. Its basis of existence was the willingness of governments to provide contingents to serve under an international command and at a minimum of cost to the United Nations. It was a symbolic force, small in size, with only 3,400 men, of whom 1,800 were available to police a line of 295 miles at the time of its withdrawal. It was equipped with light weapons only. It had no mandate of any kind to open fire except in the last resort in self-defence. It had no formal mandate to exercise any authority in the area in which it was stationed. In recent years it experienced an increasingly uncertain basis of financial support, which in turn gave rise to strong annual pressures for reduction in its strength. Its remarkable success for more than a decade, despite these practical weaknesses, may have led to wrong conclusions about its nature, but it was also pointed the way to a unique means of contributing significantly to international peace-keeping.
Annex
Cable Containing Instructions for the Withdrawal of U.N.E.F. Sent by the Secretary General to the Commander of the U.N.E.F. on 18 May 1967, at 2230 Hours New York Time
The following instructions are to be put in effect by you as of date and time of their receipt and shall remain operative until and unless new instructions are sent by me.
1. U.N.E.F. is being withdrawn because the consent of the Government of the United Arab Republic for its continued deployment on United Arab Republic territory and United Arab Republic-controlled territory has been rescinded.
2. Date of the commencement of the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. will be 19 May when the Secretary General's response to the request for withdrawal will be received in Cairo by the Government of the United Arab Republic, when also the General Assembly will be informed of the action taken and the action will become public knowledge.
3. The withdrawal of U.N.E.F. is to be orderly and must be carried out with dignity befitting a force which has contributed greatly to the maintenance of quiet and peace in the area of its deployment and has earned widespread admiration.
4. The force does not cease to exist or to lose its status or any of its entitlements, privileges and immunities until all of its elements have departed from the area of its operation.
5. It will be a practical fact that must be reckoned with by the Commander that as of the date of the announcement of its withdrawal the force will no longer be able to carry out its established function as a buffer and as a deterrent to infiltration. Its duties, therefore, after 19 May and until all elements have been withdrawn, will be entirely nominal and concerned primarily with devising arrangements and implementation of arrangements for withdrawal and the morale of the personnel.
6. The force, of course, will remain under the exclusive command of its United Nations Commander and is to take no orders from any other source, whether United Arab Republic or national.
7. The Commander, his headquarters staff and the contingent commanders shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure the continuance of good relations with the local authorities and the local population.
8. In this regard, it should be made entirely clear by the Commander to the officers and other ranks in the force that there is no discredit of the force in this withdrawal and no humiliation involved for the reason that the force has operated very successfully and with, on the whole, cooperation from the Government on the territory of an independent sovereign State for over 10 years, which is a very long time; and, moreover, the reasons for the termination of the operation are of an overriding political nature, having no relation whatsoever to the performance of the force in the discharge of its duties.
9. The Commander and subordinate officers must do their utmost to avoid any resort to the use of arms and any clash with the forces of the United Arab Republic or with the local civilian population.
10. A small working team will be sent from headquarters by the Secretary General to assist in the arrangements for, and effectuation of, the withdrawal.
11. The Commander shall take all necessary steps to protect United Nations installations, properties and stores during the period of withdrawal.
12. If necessary, a small detail of personnel of the force or preferably of United Nations security officers will be maintained as long as necessary for the protection of United Nations properties pending their ultimate disposition.
13. U.N.E.F. aircraft will continue flights as necessary in connection with the withdrawal arrangements but observation flights will be discontinued immediately.
14. Elements of the force now deployed along the line will be first removed from the line, the IF (international frontier) and ADL (armistice demarcation line), including Sharm el-Sheikh, to their camps and progressively to central staging.
15. The pace of the withdrawal will of course depend upon the availability of transport by air, sea and ground to Port Said. The priority in withdrawal should of course be personnel and their personal arms and equipment first, followed by contingent stores and equipment.
16. We must proceed on the assumption that U.N.E.F. will have full cooperation of United Arab Republic authorities on all aspects of evacuation, and to this end a request will be made by me to the United Arab Republic Government through their Mission here.
17. As early as possible the Commander of U.N.E.F. should prepare and transmit to the Secretary General a plan and schedule for the evacuation of troops and their equipment.
18. Preparation of the draft of the sections of the annual report by the Secretary General to the General Assembly should be undertaken and, to the extent possible, completed during the period of the withdrawal.
19. In the interests of the force itself and the United Nations, every possible measure should be taken to ensure against public comments or comments likely to become public on the withdrawal, the reasons for it and reactions to it.