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BRICS Long-Term Strategy
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common issues of concern including finance, technology and capacity-building.
8
The imperative for greater interest-based coordination within BRICS is exemplified
by the fact that the BASIC countries – generating over 15 per cent of global GDP
and over 25 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions by 2009 – are regarded as having
a decisive voice in international negotiations (Qi, 2011). Intra-BRICS coordination
on climate change issues also extends beyond the multilateral framework, particularly
around key concerns such as energy access and energy efficiency (table 10).
TABLE 10
Key energy metrics
Country/Grouping
Energy access (electrification –
% of population, 2005–2009)
Energy intensity
(koe/$0.5p, 2009)
Energy consumption per capita
(million btu, 2009)
OECD
100
0.15
187.850
Brazil
93
0.13
53.735
Russia
100
0.32
188.464
India
75
0.20
18.710
China
100
0.28
65.731
South Africa
66
0.31
114.437
Source: World Bank Data.
BRICS must move towards knowledge transfer for “shared prosperity”, based
on the joint development and distribution of a range of technologies. In this context,
China’s experience with both renewable energy and energy efficiency might provide
a valuable learning opportunity. Additionally, Brazil already obtains much of its
energy from sugar-based ethanol, specifically in its transportation sector. India has a
comprehensive policy framework in place for enabling greater investments and focus
on the renewable and energy efficiency sectors, as well as progressive market-based
efficiency initiatives. South Africa has also put in place various corporate governance
and sustainability norms to govern large corporate entities and enable a sustainable
growth trajectory. These are positive examples. Energy conservation through green
buildings is also an additional area on which BRICS can focus.
A key trend going forward will be the onset of major effects from climate
change – including variability of rainfall patterns, disruption of hot and cold
weather cycles, and others. The challenges presented by shifting climate patterns
will disproportionately affect developing countries, which have comparably few
resources to adequately address them. BRICS countries dependent on agriculture
will be particularly vulnerable to climate variability. BRICS countries are also home
to some of the world’s most valuable regions of biodiversity, which are vulnerable
to temperature rises.
8. Similar example of joint efforts, in this case to deal with security issues, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
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2.4.3 World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO), operationalised on 1 January 1995, is a
“rules-based” organisation that provides a negotiating forum for trade liberalisation
through multilateral agreements and trade dispute settlement. The WTO has grown
from its 128 original members to 160 countries as of September 2014, with an
additional 24 countries having applied to accede (WTO, 2015).
TABLE 11
BRICS membership of WTO/GATT
Country
WTO membership date
GATT membership date
Brazil
1 January 1995
30 July 1948
Russia
22 August 2012
-
India
1 January 1995
8 July 1948
China
11 December 2001
-
South Africa
1 January 1995
13 June 1948
Source: WTO. Understanding the WTO: the organization – members and observers. Available at: <http://goo.gl/ODLDOO>.
Accessed: 26 June 2014.
Past WTO negotiating rounds have displayed fundamental asymmetries in the
negotiation position of developed and developing countries. The fact that developed
countries account for a large share of world trade (for instance, just the USA and
the EU account for 38 per cent of imports and 23 per cent of exports) gives them
considerable bargaining power. Apart from having similar levels of per capita
income, these countries also often exhibit a tendency for collective bargaining in
international negotiations. In contrast, groupings of emerging and developing
countries are often fragmented. BRICS nations would do well to be able to rally
emerging and developing economies together for effective collective bargaining.
For instance, the applied tariff rates within developing countries and BRICS are
significantly lower than the bound rates (table 12).
TABLE 12
Bound and applied tariff rates (2014)
Countries
Non-agriculture tariff rates
Agriculture tariff rates
Bound
Applied
Bound
Applied
China
9.1
8.7
15.8
15.6
India
34.5
10.4
113.1
33.5
Brazil
30.8
14.1
35.4
10.1
Russia
7.2
9.4
11.2
13.3
South Africa
15.8
7.4
39.6
8.4
USA
3.3
3.2
4.7
4.7
EU
3.9
4.2
13.7
13.2
Japan
2.6
2.6
22.1
16.6
Source: WTO statistics database.
BRICS Long-Term Strategy
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There is also significant disparity between developed and developing countries
in terms of research capacities for strategic planning and knowledge generation.
In addition to government bodies, developed countries also have a host of independent
researchers, think tanks and private-sector interest groups which study intricate aspects
of the negotiation process and the various agreements, to chart out favourable strategies
As an illustration of this, there has been significant research in developing
countries on the relative merits and demerits of mega Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs), such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). While individual BRICS countries have
deliberated on the possible implications of the emergence of mega FTAs, there has
been little by way of a collective position or collective research on such issues.
The central issue for the BRICS governments to consider in the context of both
these agreements is the possible effects on non-member countries. Both agreements
may undermine the export competitiveness of BRICS economies and set a new
agenda for the international rules-based system on trade.
TABLE 13
Proposed mega FTAs
Trade agreement
Value of bilateral goods
(USD billions, 2011 or latest)
Date negotiations launched
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
1492.2
June 2005
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
618.5
February 2013
Source: The economist. The other conclave. 16 Mar. 2013. Available at: <http://goo.gl/1CYh01>. Accessed: 17 Sept. 2014.
3 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is in the collective interest of BRICS member nations to work together with
other economies that are part of the G20, to align policies and positions for an
optimal outcome. In this context, some of the immediately relevant areas are
highlighted below.
BRICS central banks should tailor regulatory frameworks and coordinate
closely to engage in the global regulatory agenda-setting process.
The IMF lacks the functions of a central bank and is unable to create
additional liquidity in the international monetary system by issuing new SDRs.
Moreover, even if the IMF were able to expand its mandate, it is unlikely to
receive the additional finances to compensate it for portfolio losses and exchange
rate fluctuations. BRICS would strengthen cooperation to promote the inclusion
of currencies of emerging market economies and developing countries that meet
the current SDR criteria into the SDR currency basket, in order to improve the
representativeness, stability and attractiveness of the SDR. BRICS would do well
to strengthen coordination on flexible and robust currency arrangements.
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There is substantial scope to develop the capital markets in BRICS economies
by broadening the range of asset classes on offer to efficiently channel household
savings. Expansion of capital markets should be the foremost priority for the
market regulators. BRICS stakeholders can share their experiences to enable a
robust financial market through greater investor participation, by creating the
facilitating regulatory frameworks and innovative financial products that can be
accessible to low-income classes.
BRICS should develop financial products that can target specific segments
of the population, such as derivative products for farmers to provide agricultural
insurance and innovative mutual funds for small-scale investment to develop small
and medium enterprises (SMEs).
To prevent unforeseen asset bubbles, and be better prepared to respond
to externalities in the global financial architecture, an independent BRICS
rating agency could be set up. The objective would be to prevent a build-up
of unsustainable corporate debt levels, maintain a check on banking assets,
mitigate the negative effects of the largely unregulated shadow banking sector
and maintain a watch on the performance of the global economy.
It is incumbent upon BRICS to assume a leadership role in the global political
and economic governance and seek greater equity for the developing world.
Meanwhile, BRICS countries remain ready to contribute to the improvement and
reinforcement of the global financial architecture. Reform of the Bretton Woods
Institutions is central to this objective.
BRICS would do well to maintain its efforts to achieve a comprehensive
reform of the UN, including its Security Council.
BRICS should empower civil society to supplement the calls from various
stakeholders for accelerated reforms within the Bretton Woods Institutions.
BRICS would do well to change the value-laden conditionality discourse
through collective resolve and close collaborations complementing the international
safety net with initiatives such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.
Together with huge investments in physical infrastructure, there also needs
to be commensurate financing to ensure sustainable development. In particular,
the performance of BRICS countries in several aspects of social sectors such as
health and education lags behind developed countries. Focused funding should be
directed towards capacity-building and efficient delivery of basic services.
Debt issuance in local capital markets can help avoid currency mismatch
arising out of such project funding, and help to develop nascent capital markets
in developing countries.
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Provision for concessional lending should be developed for catering to
development needs of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This could take on the
form of concessional lines of credit financed by partner countries and trust funds
similar to the IDA. Such funds, however, should be prudently managed with a
periodic review of the investment horizons and the risk–return profiles.
Given the large, urgent infrastructure financing deficits in emerging and
developing countries, the NDB could look to incorporate private capital in the
financing mix. This could be facilitated by incentives in the form of risk mitigation
guarantees and partnerships. Preferred creditor status and a cover for credit risk and
political risk could similarly incentivise private lending. In addition, a mechanism
for evaluations on a project-to-project basis could be created to ensure
transparency and accountability.
BRICS countries need to further their cross-region monetary cooperation
and enhance CRA’s effectiveness, supplementing the global financial safety net.
There is a need to coordinate interests on adaptation at the UNFCCC (particularly
on finance and technology requirements for developing countries to adapt to
climate change). The Technology Mechanism established at COP16 at Cancun
should be leveraged to enhance action on technology development and transfer,
and a commensurate share of the resources of the Green Climate Fund should be
channelled towards adaptation activities.
In international trade negotiations developed countries have focused on the
bound rates and demanded drastic cuts, not easily facilitated given the domestic
industrial competitiveness concerns in many developing economies. BRICS countries
would do well to coordinate their positions within the WTO to withstand such
pressures on the basis of existing and projected achievements and domestic viability.
Duty-free, quota-free market access
is a crucial measure to help LDCs leverage
the opportunities offered by the multilateral trading regime. Such policy initiatives
by BRICS countries will only enhance economic cooperation and consolidate
support at multilateral trade talks.
To confirm their commitment to having a stronger and rules-based multilateral
trading system at the heart of world trade governance, the BRICS countries must
aim to bring more transparency to regional agreements at the WTO.
One of the main results of the Uruguay round was the strengthening of the
diplomatic–judicial pillar of the multilateral trading system with a robust dispute
settlement mechanism – essential in reinforcing multilateral trade governance.
The mechanism needs to be improved to reduce the costs and increase the benefits
of participating in it, particularly for the poorest countries.