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Заключение
Активное развитие отношений между странами БРИКС и Африки, наблюдавшееся в последние 15 лет, внесло значительные изменения в расстановку сил между традиционными и восходящими странами-партнерами континента, в условия, способы, механизмы торгово-экономического инвестиционного сотрудничества континента с внешним миром. Практика партнерских отношений между странами-участницами БРИКС и африканскими государствами демонстрирует возможные новые, более выгодные, более результативные для африканских стран модели и схемы международного содействия развитию.
Партнерство с БРИКС способствует диверсификации внешнеэкономических связей африканских стран, открывает возможности доступа к новым источникам финансирования развития, к новым технологиям и знаниям, и тем самым создает важный ресурс сохранения устойчивости, минимизации последствий кризисов и рецессий, возникающих в США, странах ЕС, других регионах. Это партнерство вписывается в борьбу за искоренение бедности, за достижение Целей развития тысячелетия, за решение других острых проблем развития.
В частности, инвестиции стран БРИКС играют большую роль в поддержании темпов развития африканских государств. По оценкам Всемирного банка, страны БРИКС направляли в страны Африки южнее Сахары (35 стран) в последнее десятилетие до 100 млн долл. в год103 на цели развития, что составляет примерно 15% совокупного ВВП данного региона. Создание дорожной сети, энергетических мощностей, телекоммуникационного потенциала расширяет масштабы освоения природных ресурсов, снижает транспортные расходы, повышает доходность капиталовложений. Инфраструктурные инвестиции оказывают стимулирующее действие на развитие внутриафриканской торговли. Возрастающие масштабы сотрудничества с БРИКС увеличивают покупательную способность населения, налоговую базу и т.п.
Свой главный приоритет в развитии торгово-экономических отношений с Африкой страны БРИКС видят в расширении участия в разработке природных ресурсов (нефть, газ, уран, металлы, лес, сельхозугодия).
Ими движет стремление обеспечивать ресурсно-сырьевую базу для своих экономик за счет потенциала континента. Важную роль играет также заинтересованность стран БРИКС в растущем потребительском спросе в африканских странах в условиях нарастающих трудностей сбыта увеличивающихся объемов товарной продукции и услуг на собственных рынках.
Африканский континент является также притягательной и высоко прибыльной сферой приложения инвестиций стран БРИКС, особенно, в условиях сужения рамок соответствующих возможностей в развитых странах, где конъюнктура остается неустойчивой. Важными стимулами для движения в сторону африканских стран являются улучшающийся инвестиционный климат на континенте, а также рост стоимости рабочей силы в самих странах БРИКС.
Вместе с тем, широкомасштабная экспансия стран БРИКС и, прежде всего, Китая порождает в африканском политическом и экспертном сообществе ряд опасений. Они связаны, прежде всего, с углублением ресурсно-сырьевой специализации континента и появлением всей когорты угроз, породивших «концепции ресурсного проклятия» и «голландской болезни».
Другая угроза состоит в том, что широкий поток товаров и услуг из стран БРИКС подрывает местные ремесленные производства, так называемую неформальную экономику, что ведет к обострению социальных проблем. Достаточно четко просматриваются и другие «перекосы».
Большая часть инвестиций БРИКС направляется в освоение углеводородного сырья и в достаточно узкий круг стран (12–14 стран). До 70% инвестиций БРИКС в Африку приходится на одну страну – Китай. В правящих элитах как государств – участников БРИКС, так и африканских стран пока не достигнута достаточно консолидированная воля развивать в приоритетном порядке партнерство соответственно с Африкой и со странами БРИКС. И нельзя сбрасывать со счетов высокую заинтересованность БРИКС в углублении сотрудничества с другими регионами, в частности, со странами Центральной Азии, АСЕАН, Латинской Америки.
Кроме того, возникает немало вопросов относительно будущности нового форума, его способности преодолеть существующие внутри него центробежные силы и обрести необходимую сплоченность и решимость в действиях. Стоит вопрос: станет ли БРИКС структурированным объединением или останется в статусе диалогового форума. Ответы на эти вопросы может дать только время.
Единственное, что на сегодня не подлежит сомнению, – это неизменность стремления восходящих стран занять надлежащее место в полицентричном мире и в реформируемой архитектуре глобального управления. А на этом пути всестороннее взаимодействие с Африканским континентом неизбежно.
Африка слишком долго оставалась «континентом больших надежд», «континентом будущего». Сегодня пришло время, когда эти надежды начинают претворяться в жизнь. В том числе, и благодаря развитию партнерства с государствами-участниками БРИКС.
ГЛАВА II. Африканская политика
стран-членов БРИКС
1. Современная политика Бразилии в Африке (2003–2012)
Contemporary Brazilian foreign policy in Africa (2003–2012)
The African continent has become the region that has attracted the most interest on the part of emerging powers as these countries seek markets, resources and political allies. While considerable attention has been given to Indian and Chinese engagement in Africa, less attention is dedicated to contemplating Brazil’s role in the continent, and therefore, the present contribution wishes to address this gap by looking at contemporary Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa, from the government of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010) up until the first two years of the current administration by President Dilma Rousseff (2010-ongoing).
Brazil benefits from several different identity labels in its interaction with Africa: as a developing, South Atlantic, Portuguese-speaking nation, and these different identity labels will be contemplated in the analysis that follows. Brazil’s current engagement with the continent is not a new strategy by Brazilian diplomacy, but reflects a perception that was already present in the country in the 1970s and that represented a revision of Brazilian policy towards the continent. Brazil had initially supported Portuguese colonialism in Africa at the UN during the late 1940s and 1950s, but for a short period in the 1960s (the so-called “Independent Foreign Policy” period104) Brazil began to present a different stand regarding the decolonization process in Africa. At that time, Brazil was interested in diversifying its international partners and the Foreign Ministry began to articulate an African policy that would only became a reality in the mid-1970s.
If during the 1970s Brazil sought close ties with the developing world, the 1980s and 1990s represented a period of disengagement with the continent, particularly because of the impact of several economic crisis in the country. Brazil was described in the 1990s as having turned its back to Africa (Saraiva, 2010).
As will become clear from the sections bellow, Brazil currently identifies that Africa is essential to the success of Brazil’s pursuit of greater voice and recognition in the international arena. Brazilian elites believe that Brazil’s role and position in the international system is smaller than what it should be, and this assumption is mostly based on Brazil’s territorial size and population, and in the last years, in the size and strength of its economy.
In order to reduce the gap between Brazil’s aspirations and the reality of international politics, among other measures, the Brazilian government has appointed several Brazilian nationals to run for elections in international bodies, such as the World Trade Organization’s Directorate, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the support of the African continent, with over 50 votes is considered as essential for the success of these candidates. As an illustrative case, in June 2010, José Francisco Graziano was elected as FAO’s Director General (2012 to 2015) in great part because of a campaign that emphasized food security and appealed to developing countries, especially African nations, and during his inauguration speech on January 2012, he mentioned that Africa would be a priority during his mandate at FAO105. Brazil’s desire for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council also reflects the importance of obtaining political support from African nations, which represent more than 50 votes within a UN General Assembly of 193 states106.
In terms of the engagement, it should be mentioned that the Brazilian engagement in Africa benefits from the high level of professionalism on the part of Brazilian diplomats and the country’s broad representation overseas, especially the opening of new embassies under former President Lula. Compared to other developing countries, Brazil benefits from a high number of diplomatic representations in Africa and currently has 37 embassies serving the continent. It should be stressed that 17 of these were inaugurated during the Lula government (2003-2010)107. The high number of diplomatic representations leaves Brazil only behind major powers in international politics in terms of diplomatic representation in the continent, with the United States having a total of 49, China 48, France 36 and Russia 38 embassies . Brazil is also followed closely by emerging powers who also wish to increase their presence in the continent, India has a total of 27 embassies and Turkey has 31, of which 20 opened in the last 3 years108.
Brazilian foreign policy to Africa under Lula
In 2002, for the first time since the country’s independence in 1822, Brazilians elected a left-wing politician to become their president. Lula da Silva, a former trade-unionist and leader of the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) was elected with 53 million votes or 62% of the valid votes after trying in three other occasions to become president.
In his inauguration speech in January 2003, Lula mentioned his interest in strengthening the deep bonds between Brazil and the African continent, in order to help Africa reach its full potential ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.43). In fact, even before the inauguration, Marco Aurelio Garcia, a long-time foreign policy advisor to the Worker’s Party, and who was to become the presidential special advisor on international relations, had acknowledged that Brazil was in need of an African policy109.
Brazil’s strategy in Africa under the Lula government can be defined as being is based on two main fronts: first, cooperation with South Africa, due to the country’s economic potential and influence in Southern Africa and second, cooperation with the Portuguese speaking African countries, that received support from the Brazilian government to become independent from Portugal in the mid-1970s and currently receive around 70% of all Brazilian technical cooperation to Africa (IPEA, 2010).
During the Lula government, the African continent became Brazil’s fourth largest commercial partner. Trade between Brazil and Africa increased from 4 billion in 2000 to 20 billion in 2010 ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.83).Between 2003 and 2010, 48 African heads of state visited Brazil and 67 African foreign ministers visited the country in the same period ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011,p.123). In 2009, the Brazilian National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) started a line of credit worth 265 million dollars and another one worth 360 million in 2010 for companies that were willing to conduct business in Africa ( IPEA, World Bank, 2011, p.7).
Lula also pursued some important initiatives in the social aspect. During his first year as president, Lula sanctioned a law making it mandatory for elementary and high schools in Brazil, both private and public, to offer classes on African and Afro-Brazilian history110. Another important social initiative was the creation of the Secretary for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies in 2006, in order to promote the improvement in living conditions of the Afro-Brazilian population and other groups that have been historically marginalized in Brazilian history, such as the indigenous peoples.
Regarding diplomacy, Lula continued with a scholarship program, created in 2002 by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for Afro-Brazilians to receive financial assistant to pay for their preparatory studies for admission into the national diplomatic training institute. The diplomatic profession in Brazil is a historically elite career in Brazil and the exam is one of the most competitive exams within Brazilian civil service. The initiative had the intension of making Brazil’s diplomatic body more representative of the country’s racial diversity.
In addition, it is equally important to note that the effort of increasing the diplomatic presence in the African continent has not been met with the same enthusiasm on the part of Brazilian diplomats. The Brazilian Foreign Minister faces a shortage of diplomats willing to serve in the newly established diplomatic missions in African and Asian nations classified as “C and D” postings (an “A” post would be London, Paris or New York) and the staff in some of the missions includes only one diplomat, normally the designated ambassador. New diplomats resist serving in these posts because they believe that it will limit their opportunities for further promotion within the career111.
In addition, Brazil’s intention of increasing relations within the Global South was faced with internal criticism on the part of businessmen, analysts and especially former diplomats associated with the Cardoso administration. Brazil’s approach to Africa was also part of this domestic controversy, especially when Lula visited leaders that were questioned by the Western international community as having low or inexistent democratic credentials. President Lula was heavily criticized for visiting Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in July 2010, President Paul Biya of Cameroon in April 2005, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo on October 2007, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso also in October 2007 and the former Libyan head of state, Muammar Gaddafi, on two occasions, the latest in July 2009.
Nonetheless, even the controversy generated by episodes such as the visits to Libya and the issue with Equatorial Guinea was not enough to reduce the heavy symbolism of Brazil’s relations with Africa under Lula. In April 2005, during a visit to the continent, President Lula went to the island of Gorée in Senegal, the location of a former fortress from which Africans were sent to work as slaves in American countries, including Brazil. Echoing a similar visit by Pope John Paul II in 1992, Lula apologized for the use of African slaves in Brazil and recognized that Brazil had a historic debt towards Africa. At the ceremony, Lula was greeted by Senegal’s president Abdoulaye Wade as being Brazil’s first African president112.
Although the symbolic dimension played an important part in the Brazilian government’s relations with Africa, Brazil’s approach towards the continent also involves pragmatic and strategic considerations. During a July 2004 visit to Africa, Lula forgave Gabon’s 35 million dollars debt with Brazil with the intention that this amount would be converted in credit from the Gabonese government to Brazilian companies that wish to invest in the country113. Concerning multilateral affairs, the issue of Security Council reform and a future permanent seat for Brazil was discussed for example in former President Lula’s visit to Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal on April 2005. The fact that African nations could not reach a consensus regarding which states could occupy permanent seats separated for the African continent was a frustrating outcome for Brazilian diplomacy.
One element that has also strengthened Brazil’s recent engagement with the African continent under Lula, is the creation of two multilateral initiatives that include African nations. The first initiative refers to the South America-Arab States Summit114 created in 2005, and which includes 12 South American states and 22 Arab nations, 10 of which located in the African continent. The second initiative refers to the Africa-South America Summit115 initiated in 2006, with 49 African members, and that led to the creation of an Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF). Both initiatives reflect Brazil’s historical emphasis on South-South rhetoric and have contributed to the country’s regional leadership role within South America. In addition, Brazil has also sought to establish relations with the African Union (a resident embassy in Addis Ababa was inaugurated in 2005 and the ambassador was also accredited to the AU). A cooperation agreement between Brazil and the AU was signed in 2007 and former President Lula was a guest at the AU’s Summit in Sirte ( Libya) in 2009116. President Rousseff has capitalized on former President Lula’s popularity within the African continent117 and designated him as the head of the Brazilian delegation to the AU Summit held in Malabo in 2011118.
Furthermore, Brazil promotes relations with some African nations through the ZOPACAS (The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone). Initially established and promoted by Brazil in 1985 (with strong support from Nigeria), as part of an effort to reduce the threaten of militarization of the South Atlantic during the Cold War and to limit apartheid South-Africa’s influence in the region, the ZOPACAS has gained new importance with Brazil’s recent discovery119 of its pre-salt oil reserves located in the continental shelves, within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The protection of these reserves has become a national security priority for the Brazilian Navy (which refers to Brazil’s South Atlantic territory as the “Blue Amazon”) and is included in the country’s new defense strategy launched in December 2008120.
Brazilian foreign policy to Africa under Rousseff
Dilma Rousseff, the first female president of Brazil, took over from Lula in January 2011. Although coming from the same political party and sharing a similar perspective regarding the promotion of Brazil´s development, Rousseff has kept a lower profile and travelled less than her predecessor.
The current president has made her first state visit to the African continent to attend the IBSA Summit in South Africa on October 2011. The trip also included visits to Angola and Mozambique, two of Brazil´s most traditional African allies and important markets for Brazilian companies, both state and private.
Africa has been included in Brazil’s new commercial promotion strategy under the current president. The Brazilian government is looking to strengthen the commercial promotion capacity of its diplomatic representations. In Africa, there are 12 diplomatic posts that were selected, based on economic growth projection and expected demand for Brazilian goods, and that will receive additional diplomatic staff: Khartoum, Tripoli, Rabat, Cape Town, Dakar, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Lagos, Tunis, Addis Ababa and Dar es Salam121.
As part of a strategy to increase commercial relations with the African continent, the BNDES has inaugurated a new line of credit for Brazilian companies that wish to have a presence in the African continent. The bank will focus in companies that wish to operate in the areas of energy, medicine, banking services, biofuels and agriculture. These areas will complement the three main sectors in which Brazilian companies are already heavily involved in Africa: oil and gas, infra-structure and mining. The bank also wishes to increase the export of high-value industrial equipment, such as electrical and agriculture machinery122.
However, Brazil’s relations with Africa during the Rousseff administration were not reduced to commercial considerations. Because it was occupying a non-permanent seat at the Security Council123, Brazil was called to take a position regarding African security problems. On the political crisis in the Ivory Coast, the Brazilian government supported a negotiated solution to the situation in the country and expressed concern over the possibility of a military intervention in the country